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1 Introduction
The resilience of welfare states in times of "globalization" heavily depends on the impact of reduced
barriers to international labor mobility upon the ability of domestic governments to contain income
inequality within their borders. Namely, governmental income redistribution may be impaired by the
opposite migration incentives it generates along the skill distribution: at the bottom, by acting as a
welfare magnet towards low-skilled foreigners; at the top, by inducing the emigration of high-skilled
workers. In combination, those effects may severely limit the degree of progressivity that national tax-
transfer systems can afford. Despite the prominent role played by arguments of this nature in policy
debates, their empirical relevance is still subject to much debate. Clearly, a quantification of the effects
of redistributive policies on migration flows is a necessary pre-condition for a reliable evaluation of
such policies. In this paper, we contribute to the assessment of those effects by studying a unique
administrative dataset that covers almost the entirety of the Italian migrant population worldwide and
allows us to recover migration flows from Italy since 1960.
Italy is one of the countries in the world with the highest absolute number of emigrants. The data-
set we scrutinize encompasses 88% of all Italians registered abroad, more than four million people.
They account for the Italian population in 13 foreign countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, France, Great-Britain, Germany, The Netherlands, New-Zealand, Switzerland, the US, and
Venezuela. Of these, about 1.3 million personally have migration experience (i.e. were born in Italy).
To the best of our knowledge, the only other study testing the selection process of migrants with
administrative data on almost the entire population of emigrants is Borjas et al. (2018) using Danish
migration register data.1
Italy is an ideal laboratory to explore the effects of domestic income redistribution on migra-
tion patterns. Previous micro-data based studies mostly deal with migration flows from developing
countries to developed countries, hence from typically poor and unequal to rich and less unequal
countries (as pointed out by Hatton, 2014), or as mentioned above from Denmark, a country with a
compressed income distribution, to the rest of the world. In contrast, the current study proper invest-
igates migration outflows from a country with medium levels of inequality and redistribution, Italy,
from which millions migrated either to countries with less progressive tax systems, like Argentina,
1The fifteen countries with the highest number of emigrants are Russia, Mexico, India, Bangladesh, Ukraine, China,
UK, Germany, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Philippines, Italy, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Morocco. Denmark places 122th on
this ranking with about 240,000 emigrants (Global Migrant Origin Database v4, Migration DRC).
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Brazil, Venezuela, New Zealand and the US, or to countries with more progressive ones, like Bel-
gium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Hence, we are able to empirically evaluate both effects
of income redistribution on migration: the welfare-magnet effect at the bottom, and the rich-repulsion
effect at the top of the income distribution.
We find that variations in time and space of governmental redistribution of income contribute
to explaining migration patterns out of Italy over the last half-century. A larger amount of income
redistribution in a destination country is associated with negative selection of Italian migrants with
respect to their skills. This relationship holds even after controlling for individual characteristics
of the migrants, country characteristics like GDP per capita and the unemployment rate, migration
costs (approximated by the distance of the country of residence to the Italian border), the existence
of migration agreements between the two countries, and the share of migrants from the same Italian
province residing in the same country (an indicator of network effects), as well as country fixed
effects. Furthermore, the skill distribution of Italian migrants in countries with relatively low levels
of redistribution stochastically dominates the distribution of Italian migrants in countries with high
levels of redistribution as well as the distribution of Italian residents. We also find evidence for
selection on unobservable characteristics, measured by the probability of being unemployed or having
a distinctively high occupational position, given one’s level of education.
Results from a discrete-choice model of the decision to migrate, one that includes demographic
characteristics and place characteristics of the country of destination, offer further support for the
hypothesis that more redistribution adversely affects the skill composition of the domestic workforce.
Based on such an empirical model, we perform a simple policy experiment in order to gauge the
magnitude of the involved effects. Holding the tax-transfer-system in all destination countries fixed
at their current level, we investigate the impact of an additional affine budget-neutral redistributive
policy in Italy on the migration behavior of Italian citizens and the resulting skill composition of
the resident population in Italy. Our initial policy experiment has the Italian government introducing
a yearly demogrant of one thousand USD per adult, implying a rise of public expenditures in Italy
of about two percentage points of GDP. Such a policy is found to lower the outflows of low-skilled
individuals and increase the outflows of high-skilled individuals, and to have a negligible impact
on the migration of medium-skilled workers. Despite its first-order fiscal magnitude, the quantitative
impact of this policy on the composition of the resident workforce in Italy turns out to be of the second
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order. When we raise the demogrant, and thus the degree of progressivity of the policy experiment,
the same qualitative pattern prevails but the effects become quantitatively more important. However,
even a five-fold increase of the demogrant does not lead to a substantial shift of the Italian skill
distribution to the left. We therefore conclude that in Italy the effects of more redistribution on the
skill composition of migration flows are statistically significant, but have limited significance for the
evaluation of redistributive policies.
The current paper is mainly related to two strands of literature, one on migration and the predic-
tions of the Roy model, and one on income redistribution under the threats of migration. A large body
of work on migration has pointed out that migrants are not a random draw from the population of their
home country, neither are they undistinguishable in their observable and unobservable characteristics
from the native population of their host country. Besides this basic consensus, different findings on
the patterns characterizing the self-selection of immigrants coexist.
In an influential paper, Borjas (1987) applies the Roy model of self-selection and argues that the
returns to human capital in source and destination country determine whether high or low skilled
individuals migrate: the higher are the returns to human capital in a country, the more high skilled
individuals will tend to migrate to this country. This hypothesis has been empirically confirmed by
Moraga (2010) and Parey et al. (2017), among others. On the other side, Chiswick (1999) argues
in favour of a general positive selection of migrants, in line with the predictions of standard human
capital theory since Sjaastad (1962); this hypothesis has been confirmed in empirical studies by Liebig
and Sousa-Poza (2004) and Chiquiar and Hanson (2005).
The empirical measurement of returns to skills has not been uniform in this branch of literature.
Some studies focus on the educational attainment, some on earnings, and some on measures of income
redistribution. We employ all of these variables in order to approximate the relative level of returns to
skills, and show that consistent results are obtained throughout.
Another crucial issue in this literature is the availability of suitable data sources to test the the-
ory. Most existing studies on the self-selection of migrants rely on macro-data containing aggregate
information on the characteristics of migrants, census data which allows the analysis of flows and
stocks of migrants from one particular country to another (mostly from Mexico to the US), or survey
data reporting pre-migration earnings or migration intentions. Further evaluations using novel data
sources therefore seem necessary to deepen our understanding about the process of migrants’ self-
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selection. As we explain in detail in Section 3, the administrative dataset we use offers the possibility
to substantially enrich the empirical basis for a more comprehensive assessment of the Roy model.
We complement our administrative dataset with Italian household survey data that can be used
to measure selection on observable characteristics predicting the counterfactual labour earnings of
immigrants had they stayed in Italy. We also estimate the relative educational position of every mi-
grant with respect to his or her reference group, i.e. non-migrants born in the same year living in the
Italian region where the individual resided before moving to the foreign country. Furthermore, we use
harmonized household survey data from the Luxembourg Income Study to estimate the net monetary
returns to migration in the destination country, as well as the counterfactual potential returns in all
other possible destination countries as well as in Italy.
The second line of research to which we contribute is the public economics of redistribution in
the presence of international migration. An early goal of this line of research was to examine the
welfare-magnet hypothesis, i.e. the claim that generous social welfare programs prompt immigration
of individuals who are more likely to use such programs. A number of empirical studies - especially
in the wake of the EU enlargements that introduced freedom of movement for Eastern European
workers - found rather little support for that hypothesis (Levine and Zimmerman, 1999; Gelbach,
2004; McKinnish, 2007; Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009; Giulietti et al., 2013; Skupnik, 2014). Immig-
ration seems to be primarily driven by differentials in unemployment and wages between the source
and the destination countries, rather than by the relative magnitude of social transfers. Razin and
Wahba (2015) suggest that such evidence may be confounded by heterogeneous legal frameworks
that restrict international mobility, and find strong support for the welfare-magnet hypothesis in free-
migration regimes. We control for labor mobility restrictions and also find that countries with more
generous welfare programs tend to attract a larger fraction of low-skilled Italian workers. However,
our policy experiment corroborates the notion that such effects are relatively modest.
The role played by tax-driven migrations in shaping optimal tax-transfer systems has been in-
vestigated in a number of theoretical articles (e.g. Simula and Trannoy, 2010; Bierbrauer et al., 2013;
Lehmann et al., 2014; Ruiz del Portal, 2017). Numerical simulations based on extended Mirrlees-type
models have shown that such effects are potentially large, particularly with respect to the welfare of
the households at the top of the skill distribution. Empirical investigations that exploit the coexist-
ence of free movement and local tax autonomy within Switzerland, however, found relatively small
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effects. By way of an example, according to Liebig et al. (2007) they are not large enough to offset
the revenue-increasing effect from a rise in tax rates. Empirical results with the same flavor have been
obtained for mobility across US states (e.g. Young and Varner, 2011) and Canadian provinces (e.g.
Day and Winer, 2006). Some recent papers have challenged this view by pointing to substantial tax-
induced labor mobility in various settings. Kleven et al. (2013a) examine the European football labor
market, Kleven et al. (2013b) study the inflow in Denmark of foreign top earners under a preferential
tax scheme, Akcigit et al. (2016) look at the international mobility of inventors, Moretti and Wilson
(2017) consider the internal migration of star scientists in the US. All of these papers estimate large
elasticities of migration with respect to taxation. However, if the considered groups are small, this
might be consistent with overall small fiscal effects from migration. As pointed out by Kleven et al.
(2019) in a recent review of the literature, the lack of systematic evidence on migration elasticities of
a broader population, and across different countries, makes it still difficult to draw conclusions. Our
analysis contributes to fill this gap in both dimensions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly sketches the theoretical
framework that motivates the empirical research on the self-selection of migrants, and discusses its
evaluation by the literature. Section 3 describes the distinct data sources and measurement procedures
we employ in the subsequent analysis. Section 4 offers a first impression of the relationship between
redistribution and migration found in the data, by means of simple bivariate correlations. Section 5
presents a battery of empirical exercises aimed at assessing the statistical significance of the relation-
ship between redistribution and migrants’ self-selection. Section 6 describes our redistributive-policy
experiment and shows its impact on the skill composition of the resident population. Section 7 con-
cludes.
2 Returns to Skills and Self-selection of Migrants
The working hypothesis that underlies much of the literature, including the current paper, is that
migration decisions are driven by the quest for a potentially higher level of disposable income, net of
migration costs. Because disposable incomes are affected by governmental income redistribution in
each country, host countries characterized by a less progressive tax-transfer system are expected to
attract relatively more high-skilled migrants, while those with a more progressive system will tend to
attract migrants with a lower skill level.
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In a nutshell, the logic of the theory that underpins these statements can be displayed in a basic
model with three countries: a country of origin (I), an egalitarian destination country (G), and an
inegalitarian destination country (U). For the sake of the argument, suppose that all three countries
have access to the same constant returns-to-scale technology and individuals in I can obtain the same
productivity in any country, equal to their skill level s≥ 0; individuals differ with respect to their skill
level. Assume that in every country an affine tax schedule redistributes income, so that disposable
income (gross of migration costs) in country c ∈ {I,G,U} reads:
yc = ωc+(1− tc)s, (1)
where ωc is the social minimum (a demogrant) and 1− tc ≡ ρc determines the marginal net return to
skill in country c. Our assumptions on progressivity are that ρU > ρI > ρG and ωU < ωI < ωG.
If migrations costs are negligible for individuals who may migrate from I, their location choice
will maximize disposable income yc. In any equilibrium in which every country (including I) attracts
individuals at some skill level, the resulting pattern will be of the type illustrated in Figure 1. Indi-
viduals from I with a skill level lower than s1 will migrate to G, because what they give up in terms of
higher taxes is more than compensated by the demogrant they receive. Individuals with a skill level
higher than s2 will migrate to U , because what they give up in terms of a lower demogrant is more
than compensated by the lower taxes they must pay. Individuals with a skill level between s1 and s2
will optimally refrain from migrating and remain in I.
If migration costs mc - expressed in monetary terms - are non-negligible, migration decisions will
maximize yc−mc by choice of c∈ {I,G,U}. If migration costs are not too large in absolute terms and
uniform across all individuals, the resulting migration pattern will exhibit the same type of selection
as in Figure 1. Setting mI = 0, the skill thresholds will be given by
s1 =
ωG−mG−ωI
ρI−ρG , (2)
s2 =
ωI +mU −ωU
ρU −ρI . (3)
If migration costs vary across individuals, but are uncorrelated with the skill level, the same migration
pattern will arise in statistical terms: e.g., country G may attract migrants with a high level of skills
who exhibit a low level (possibly negative) of mG, but the average skill level of the received migrants
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Figure 1: Positive and Negative Self-Selection of Migrants
will be lower than both the average skills of migrants to U (the less egalitarian destination) and the
average skills of those who stay in I.
The predictions of theoretical frameworks of this kind were first scrutinized using data on inter-
national and internal migrants in the US: Borjas (1987) finds that the degree of income inequality in
the home country, a proxy measure for the returns to skills, is a predictor for the type of selectivity
of migrants, while Borjas et al. (1992) show that interstate variations in the returns to skills affect the
skill structure of migration inflows. In contrast, Chiswick (1999) states that immigrants also tend to
be favourably self-selected in the presence of higher levels of income inequality and Borjas (1987)’s
empirical results only show that income inequality attenuates the degree of selection, but not the gen-
erally positive selection pattern. Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004) support this claim in an analysis of
cross-country survey data on migration intentions. Recent studies that review the empirical literature
and also test this theory are Parey et al. (2017) and Patt et al. (2017).
A likely explanation for the diverging results of some empirical studies points to the important role
of migration costs for the migration decision and the selection process. For instance, Chiquiar and
Hanson (2005) show that if migration costs are negatively correlated with the skill level, both positive
and negative self-selection into countries with higher returns are possible equilibrium outcomes. In
turn, migration costs are determined not only by transportation costs and the value of friends, family,
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and culture left behind, but also by immigration policies and migration networks (Hatton, 2014).
McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) find that self-selection is more likely to be positive in places with
sparse migration networks and more likely to be negative in places where many migrants from the
same origin countries reside.
3 Data & Measurement
3.1 Administrative data on Italians abroad
The micro-data basis of our investigation is the Registry of Italians resident abroad (Anagrafe degli
italiani residenti all’estero, AIRE), an administrative registry dataset that is managed by the Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All Italians who have resided abroad for at least one year or were born
outside of Italy are required to register to the AIRE by law.2 Furthermore, some bureaucratic tasks,
e.g. renewing an Italian passport or ID card, and voting in Italian elections, are only possible for
Italian migrants if they are recorded in the AIRE; crucially, Italians who live abroad are generally
liable to the Italian fiscal authority for paying personal income tax, unless they are registered in the
AIRE.
Our dataset encompasses approximately 88% of all Italian citizens registered in the AIRE world-
wide; it provides individual information on 4,079,646 registered Italian citizens in 13 different foreign
countries between 2014 and 2015, as well as information on their spouses and children without Italian
citizenship.3 Table 1 shows the number of individuals in our dataset, subdivided according to country
of residence, birth year, and year of arrival in the host country.
The individual information contained in the registry data at our disposal includes: date of birth,
date of arrival in the host country, sex, place of birth, place of residence, education, occupation and
the last municipality of residence in Italy before migration.
We restrict our attention to Italians with own migration experience; thus, we focus on migrants
that were born in Italy and exclude the foreign-born children and grandchildren of migrants (so-
2Enrollment is a citizen’s right and duty established by law no. 470/1988. Only Italian civil servants working abroad,
for instance at embassies or consulates, diplomatics, and Italian military in service at NATO facilities located abroad are
not required to register to the AIRE.
3 The number of Italians registered in AIRE on January 1, 2015, is 4,636,647 (Fondazione Migrantes, 2015). The
only country missing in our sample of the ten countries with the highest concentration of Italian immigrants worldwide
in 2015 is Spain. Furthermore, our data for France only includes Italian citizens registered in two out of five consulates
(about 50 % of all Italians residing in France). All estimations excluding France are not significantly different to our main
results and can be found in the Supplemental Material. A comparison of the number of Italian migrants in AIRE and the
International Migration Database of the OECD is also included in the Supplemental Material.
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Table 1: Number of registered individuals in the registry of Italians resident abroad (AIRE)
Registered in AIRE
Total Italian citizenship Born in Italy Born 1940-1985 Arrival 1960-2015
ARG 1,191,059 893,974 119,008 50,044 7,271
AUS 221,292 149,246 53,900 35,277 18,444
BEL 333,235 273,415 95,438 67,160 34,249
BRA 597,232 450,939 36,804 19,334 7,454
CAN 188,289 137,289 72,909 43,645 24,318
CH 695,081 607,084 220,133 168,060 117,636
FRA 214,512 170,023 70,736 45,468 23,785
GBR 308,077 263,916 130,100 87,127 60,511
GER 813,254 694,694 300,863 258,315 165,929
NLD 48,895 41,346 16,767 12,782 4,696
NZL 5,056 4,052 1,497 1,100 757
USA 334,093 250,176 133,498 97,212 67,086
VEN 218,351 143,492 28,801 14,097 4,972
Total 5,168,426 4,079,646 1,280,454 899,621 537,108
Notes: Subsequent columns show the respective subtotal. Our data for France only includes Italian citizens registered in
two out of five consulates (about 50 % of all Italians residing in France).
called second and third generation migrants) from our final sample. In order to ensure that one’s skill
is known at the time the individual decides to migrate, we concentrate on individuals who had already
finished their educational career when migrating; thus we exclude all individuals that registered with
AIRE when younger than 20 years of age. In order to avoid biases deriving from, first, individuals
who have not yet finished their educational career, and secondly, differential mortality of people with
different levels of education, we restrict our final sample to the age range 30 to 75, i.e. to the cohorts
born between 1940 and 1985. Hence, our analysis pertains to migration from Italy that occurred
between 1960 and 2015. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for individual and country characteristics
from our final sample.
How do the levels of education of Italian emigrants compare to those of the population in Italy?
The answer to this question depends on the cohorts under consideration. Figure 2 allows one to
compare the average years of education of Italians who migrated (Mover) to the average years of
education of Italians living in Italy (Stayer) born in the same year.4 On average, male and female
Italians born between 1940 and 1961 and living abroad in 2015 have lower educational attainment
than the average of the Italian population of people born in the same years. After this birth-year,
subsequent cohorts of emigrants have a relatively higher average level of education than the stayers
4Years of schooling are coded following this scheme: No school degree, 0 years. Uncompleted compulsory schooling,
5 years. Compulsory schooling, 8 years. Beyond compulsory education, 13 years. Tertiary degree, 16 years.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample – Country Averages
Year of birth Year of arrival Share of female Years of education Rural origin Capital Internal migrant GDP p.c. GDP growth Unemployment rate Distance (in tsd km) Bilateral agreement Policy toward high skilled
ARG 1948.48 1994.83 0.53 8.39 0.45 0.21 0.11 6.33 4.16 8.41 10.200 1 0
AUS 1958.68 1988.86 0.40 9.79 0.31 0.00 0.13 24.19 3.70 5.18 12.100 1 0
BEL 1960.24 1992.26 0.42 10.51 0.20 0.06 0.15 24.13 2.47 7.57 0.530 1 0
BRA 1961.08 2001.67 0.20 12.68 0.15 0.01 0.21 7.07 3.23 8.21 7.000 1 1
CAN 1952.83 1980.98 0.43 8.74 0.39 0.02 0.09 14.75 3.88 6.36 5.000 1 1
CH 1961.66 1994.45 0.39 10.28 0.32 0.01 0.16 49.66 1.71 3.06 0.000 1 1
FRA 1966.65 2000.83 0.46 13.23 0.17 0.32 0.18 30.62 1.80 9.18 0.000 1 0
GBR 1971.28 2004.40 0.42 13.17 0.17 0.48 0.17 35.29 2.18 6.68 0.900 1 0
GER 1960.66 1990.60 0.37 8.62 0.31 0.04 0.11 23.13 2.09 5.85 0.070 1 0
NLD 1973.91 2007.96 0.37 14.43 0.14 0.28 0.19 46.05 1.10 5.46 0.640 1 0
NZL 1970.54 2006.04 0.42 13.72 0.13 0.14 0.18 30.39 2.37 5.28 18.000 0 0
USA 1960.30 1993.88 0.43 11.58 0.20 0.01 0.14 30.13 2.87 6.12 6.100 0 1
VEN 1950.67 1983.97 0.40 10.36 0.24 0.47 0.16 3.88 3.32 8.45 7.700 0 .
Total 1962.10 1994.36 0.40 10.55 0.27 0.11 0.14 30.94 2.34 5.81 1.952 1 0
Sources: Individual characteristics from AIRE. Sample is restricted to people born in Italy, 30-64 years old, and who
registered in AIRE after the age of 20. Unemployment rate, GDP growth, GDP per capita from World Bank Data.
Distance to Italy measured from border to border (Google Maps). Migration agreement is equal to one if there is/have
been bilateral migration agreements between Italy and the country of destination; information retrieved from different
sources. Policies oriented towards high skilled is equal to one if the policies of the country in the last 50 years have been
more oriented at attracting high skilled immigrants or disincentive low skilled immigrants; information retrieved from the
DEMIG Policy Database.
by about one year of education. It turns out that particularly the share of emigrants with a completed
tertiary education degree experienced a dramatic increase. With respect to gender differences, movers
and stayers share a common feature: older men have more education than women, while younger
women are more educated than men.
In Italy, socio-economic variables differ considerably across macro-regions. Figure 3 shows the
differences in average educational attainment between movers and stayers by Italian macro-region of
origin, and across cohorts. Movers from the Center and the North of Italy have a constantly higher
level of education than the stayers from the same regions, while movers from the South of Italy
and the Islands have lower or similar average educational attainment as compared to stayers. These
findings suggest that the region of origin contains valuable information when it comes to assessing
the selection of migrants.
3.2 Earnings and income data
In order to evaluate the theoretical predictions described above, incomes and counterfactual incomes,
both in Italy and the destination countries, must be estimated. This is why we complement the AIRE
dataset with more detailed information that enables us to impute incomes to the individuals in our
sample.
We use the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) provided by the Bank of Italy as
the main source of information on the origin country. The SHIW collects information on Italian
households, including individual characteristics for each adult household member. For the present
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Figure 2: Average Years of Education of Italian Mover and Stayer by Year of Birth. Italians of all
regional origins and subdivided by gender.
Source: Averages for Mover are own calculations using AIRE, averages for Stayer are own calculations using SHIW.
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Figure 3: Average Years of Education of Italian Mover and Stayer by Year of Birth and Geo-graphic
Macro-Region of Origin.
Source: Averages for Mover are own calculations using AIRE, averages for Stayer are own calculations using SHIW.
study, we use the comparable survey waves from 1977 to 2014, normalizing the sampling weights for
each single year if more than one single wave is used for the analysis.
We employ this dataset to run an augmented Mincer regression of log labour earnings on the
SHIW sample in 2014, and use the coefficients of that regression to predict the counterfactual log
labour earnings that emigrants would have obtained, had they stayed in Italy.5 The variables included
in the regression are: years of schooling, age, quadratic age, sex, Italian region of origin, Italian region
of birth, and an indicator on whether the individual is an internal migrant (i.e. does not live in the
same region or did not migrate from the same region where he or she was born). To better capture
lifetime earnings, for this exercise we exclude from the estimation individuals below 35 and older
than 55 (see Bönke et al., 2015). Table 3 shows the OLS estimates in column (1).
To account for the selection of migrants in the earnings equation that could bias OLS estimates,
we apply the Heckman selection procedure in two stages. In the first stage, the population weighted
probability to emigrate is estimated on the pooled sample of stayer and mover, i.e. pooling SHIW and
5We estimate the Mincer regression on all individuals in SHIW data with positive labor earnings and then predict the
log labor earnings also for all Italians in SHIW, including those with missing information about their labor earnings.
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Table 3: Augmented Mincer regressions to predict log labour earnings
Sample Italians in Italy (SHIW) Italians worldwide (AIRE+SHIW)
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Heckman Selection equation
Dependent variable log Labour Earnings log Labour Earnings Stayer (0/1)
Female -0.401∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.0257) (0.0309) (0.0246)
Age 0.0220 0.0180 0.00484
(0.0338) (0.0341) (0.0362)
Age × Age -0.0000830 -0.0000264 0.00000324
(0.000370) (0.000374) (0.000398)
Years of education 0.0633∗∗∗ 0.0547∗∗∗ -0.0358∗∗∗
(0.00406) (0.00694) (0.00365)
Internal migrant 0.0273 -0.0216 -0.157∗∗∗
(0.0592) (0.0652) (0.0452)
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.521
(1.596)
Number of emigrants born in the same year and region -0.000204∗∗∗
(0.0000748)
_cons 8.330∗∗∗ 8.408∗∗∗ 2.462∗∗∗
(0.761) (0.767) (0.814)
Region of origin and birth controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2754 2754 157836
R2 0.273 0.274
Notes: Weighted regressions using survey design waves from SHIW and constructed population weights for AIRE. Robust
standard errors. Statistical significance level * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Source: SHIW and AIRE, own estimations.
AIRE data.6 Hereby, the number of emigrants born in the same year and in the same Italian region
as the individual are included as further predictors of his or her probability of staying in Italy.7 The
assumption is that this captures the predictive power of network effects and diasporas on individual
migration decisions, without exerting a direct effect on earnings in 2014. Then, the inverse Mills
Ratio for each observation, estimated in the first stage, is included in the earnings regression as an
additional control variable to obtain unbiased estimates. Table 3 shows the coefficients from this
procedure in column (2) and the first-stage estimates in column (3).
The estimates in Table 3 show that the coefficients change only slightly and the coefficient of
the Mills ratio is not significantly different from zero. This means that the observable characteristics
included in the regression account for selection properly and we can safely adopt the predictions from
the OLS estimates. We report results from using the counterfactual labour earnings estimated with
the Heckman procedure in the Supplementary Material. These results do not significantly differ from
those presented in the main text.
The key variable in the migration model sketched above is the net income the individuals receive
as a consequence of locating in a given country. We use harmonized microdata from the Luxembourg
6For SHIW we use the data design weights. For AIRE we compute weights that counterbalance the observations with
missing information on educational attainment.
7To approximate the total amount of emigrants for each birth cohort and Italian region of birth we use the AIRE data
for the countries at our disposal.
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Income Study (LIS) to estimate the net incomes in the country of residence of emigrants, their coun-
terfactual net incomes in Italy, and in each of the other possible destination countries. Furthermore,
we use that dataset to compute the net incomes of stayers in Italy, as well as their counterfactual in-
comes in all possible destinations. This part of the analysis is based on survey samples of every single
destination country around the year 2014. Unfortunately, LIS data is not available for Argentina, New
Zealand, and Venezuela. Furthermore, the last available survey for Belgium dates back to the year
2000. Therefore, whenever net incomes are involved, our results are derived from the remaining nine
possible destination countries and Italy.
Using country-specific LIS data – on a sample of the resident population excluding people with
disabilities – we estimate an augmented Mincer regression of disposable household income on a set
of individual controls that include sex, age, quadratic age, education, and indicators as to whether the
individual is married and whether at least one child lives in the household. The results table show-
ing the coefficients of these regressions for each country can be found in the Supplemental Material.
Then, we predict the disposable incomes (in international US Dollars, and applying Purchasing Power
Parity) of Italian migrants in all possible destinations and in Italy using the coefficients of this regres-
sion. Returns to migration are then defined as the difference between predicted net incomes in the
destination country and the counterfactual net income in Italy.
In most countries, the LIS does not contain a country-of-origin variable. In the few where it is
available, the number of observations for (first generation) Italian immigrants is too low to provide
consistent estimates. In principle, in most countries it would be possible to restrict the sample just
to immigrants. However, without further specification, the ample heterogeneity within the group of
immigrants leads to a very dispersed income distribution among this group in every country. Hence,
we do not restrict the country-samples and assume that the (conditional) disposable incomes of Italian
immigrants in the destination countries are not different from the incomes of natives and other im-
migrants with the same observable characteristics. To relax this assumption, in a further sensitivity
analysis that is included in the Supplemental Material we adopt an alternative way to estimate net
incomes, taking into account that the productivity associated with the level of education obtained by
migrants in their source country might be different from the average productivity in the host country.
There, we estimate the augmented Mincer regression on disposable household income with LIS data
including a linear measure for years of schooling (instead of educational categories as in the main
15
application). Then, we multiply the years of schooling of Italian migrants with a factor that measures
the relative quality of the Italian education system with respect to the respective host country; we
take this measure, based on PISA scores, from Razin and Wahba (2015). Finally, we estimate the net
incomes, as before, using the coefficients of the Mincer regression.
For our main empirical exercise we use total yearly household income after taxes and transfers.
Results that make use of an equivalence scale can be found in the Supplemental Material, and are
similar to those presented in the main text.
3.3 Country characteristics
We collect data on country characteristics from the following sources: the Standardized World Income
Inequality Database (SWIID), the World Income Inequality Database (WIID), World Bank Macro
Data (WB-Data), and the Andrew Young School World Tax Indicators (WTI). From the SWIID we
retrieve net and market income inequality indices and compute measures for absolute and relative
redistribution, the first one measured by the difference between the market and net Gini index, the
second one by this difference divided by the market Gini (see Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Solt,
2016). Since the heterogeneity in the degree of redistribution is the driving force in the theoretical
model, we now illustrate this heterogeneity in the data. Figure 4 shows the average level of pre
and post-redistribution inequality for all countries in our sample. The vertical distance from the 45
degree line shows the mechanical contribution (in Gini points) of taxes and transfers to the reduction
of market income inequality. In Figure 5, on the vertical axis redistribution is defined in absolute
terms while on the horizontal axis it is defined in relative terms. The Figure shows that countries
rank in a similar way according to each definition of redistribution. Three groups of countries can be
identified, with, respectively, a high, medium and low level of income redistribution. The first group
comprises Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and France. The second includes Italy, Great-Britain,
Australia, Switzerland, Canada, and the US. The third is formed by New-Zealand, Brazil, Venezuela,
and Argentina. Figure 6 shows the time trends in the evolution of governmental redistribution of
income in each destination country, as compared to Italy.
To cross-check the results obtained using SWIID we have performed the same type of analysis
using WIID, and obtained similar results. The latter is a dataset with less observations for each
country than the former, but has been argued in the past to rely on a more consistent methodology
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Figure 4: Levels of Inequality Pre- and Post-Redistribution
Source: SWIID, own calculations. Average over all available years.
Figure 5: Absolute and relative redistribution
Source: SWIID, own calculations. Average over all available years.
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Figure 6: Redistribution trends with respect to Italy
Source: SWIID, own calculations.
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than SWIID (see Jenkins, 2015). For the countries in our sample, including Italy, we find a very high
degree of congruence between SWIID and WIID data, with a correlation of about 0.95. From the WTI
data we retrieve a measure for the Marginal Tax Rate Progression and thus also run all the tests with
this alternative measure; the results confirm the main analysis and are included in the Supplemental
Material.
4 Redistribution and Migration: Preliminary Evidence
According to the theory, migration choices are driven by the post-fisc value of human capital that
individuals can achieve in the available countries, net of migration costs. Governmental redistribution
of income in every country affects the valorization of human capital in such a way that individuals
with a low level of pre-fisc human capital tend to have an incentive to migrate to countries with
more redistribution, whereas individuals with a high level of pre-fisc human capital tend to have an
incentive to migrate to countries with less redistribution. We now scrutinize this prediction in light of
our data on migration from Italy since 1960.
The data we collected allow us to capture the concept of pre-fisc human capital in two different
ways, for each of which a separate assessment of the theory is in order. The most straightforward way
to capture an individual’s human capital in our data is to proxy it by the individual’s level of education.
As mentioned above, the assessment of self-selection often depends on the definition of the reference
population. Spitzer and Zimran (2018) analyse self-selection in stature of Italians that migrated to
the US between 1907 and 1925. Their findings show that Italian immigrants were negatively selected
with respect to the Italian national average height, but positively selected among their province of
origin. This highlights the importance of evaluating selection patterns with respect to the correct
reference group, for instance, at the sub-national level. Indeed, simple educational attainment misses
potentially major variations in human capital that stem from variations in the quality of one year of
education both over time and across space. An individual’s human capital, her long-run potential
to earn income in the various destination countries, may therefore be better captured by the relative
educational achievement of the individual.
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This is the first way in which we bring the theory to the data. We define the relative educational
position of individual i born in year b as the relative difference of her years of education e with respect
to the average of stayers born in the same year and residing in her Italian region of origin j:
sei jb =
ei jb− e jb
e jb
. (4)
Values of this variable higher than zero represent positive selection on education, i.e. migrants are
more educated than the average of their reference group, while negative values correspond to negative
selection.
Figure 7 shows a map of Italy that displays the average relative educational position of Italians
registered in AIRE by their province of origin. People in Southern Italy have, on average, lower
levels of education than people in the North, and this pattern also applies to the migrants from those
areas. The Figure reveals that migrants from the North tend to be positively selected among the
population in that area, whereas migrants from the South of Italy are negatively selected. This pattern
holds irrespective of the time of migration, although over time the overall degree of selection has
progressively shifted towards a more positive one for most regions. Some significant variations with
respect to destination countries are displayed in Figure 8. Italian migrants to Brazil, New Zealand,
and Venezuela exhibit positive selection, independently of their time of arrival. Quite the opposite
holds in the case of Germany, where only in recent years Italian migrants are positively selected.
The relationship between redistribution and the relative education of Italian migrants is illustrated
in Figure 9. The amount of redistribution is computed as the average relative redistribution over all
available years in SWIID. This is plotted against the average relative educational position of Italian
emigrants residing in the same country. The population weighted correlation is -0.38.
The second way in which pre-fisc human capital can be captured in our data is by the individuals’
expected yearly earnings. As explained in the previous Section, no earnings information is included
in the AIRE dataset and we use the SHIW of the Bank of Italy to predict migrants’ counterfactual
earnings in Italy. A drawback of yearly earnings as a measure of human capital is the low statistical
association between yearly earnings and lifetime earnings at the beginning and at the end of the life-
cycle. In order to avoid the corresponding bias, here we restrict our attention to individuals in the
age-range 35 to 55. As shown by Bönke et al. (2015), yearly earnings in that part of the life-cycle are
strongly correlated with permanent earnings.
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Figure 7: Relative educational position of Italian Mover by their province of origin.
Notes: Maps show the province level average of relative educational position of all individuals in our AIRE sample. The
individual relative educational position is estimated with respect to the population of stayer born in the same year and
residing in the region of origin. Averages for Stayer are own calculations using SHIW.
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Figure 8: Average Relative Educational Position of Italian Mover by Year of Arrival and Country of
Residence
Notes: Relative educational position computed with respect to stayer born in the same year and resident in the region
of origin. A value of zero is equivalent to the average of the reference group, values lower than zero show a negative
selection, and values higher than zero a positive selection, on average. Source: AIRE, own estimates. Regional averages
for every birth cohort are estimated using SHIW.
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Figure 9: Returns to skills and self-selection of immigrants - Relative Educational Position
Notes: All variables are averages over the complete observation period. Sample are Italian immigrants aged 30-75.
Sources: AIRE, SWIID, own calculations.
Figure 10 depicts the relation between redistribution and earnings. The population weighted
correlation is -0.65. If we replace the average relative distribution retrieved from SWIID with the
Marginal Tax Rate Progression retrieved from the World Tax Indicators Data (WTI), the population
weighted correlations with counterfactual earnings and relative educational position of Italian immig-
rants are -0.75 and -0.58, respectively. In sum, independently of the proxy for human capital and
redistribution we employ, the preliminary evidence discussed in this section corroborates the notion
that countries with a more progressive redistributive system negatively select their immigrants from
Italy.
5 Redistribution and degree of self-selection
5.1 Selection on observable skills
Are the insights derived from the previous Section robust to the inclusion of more information about
how redistribution has changed over time, and across countries? To reach deeper into the association
between the level of redistribution and the self-selection of migrants, we run the following linear
regression:
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Figure 10: Returns to skills and self-selection of immigrants - Counterfactual earnings
Notes: All variables are averages over the complete observation period. Sample are Italian immigrants aged 35-55.
Sources: AIRE, SWIID, own calculations.
s∗i jtc = α+βRtc+δ
′Ztc+ γ
′
Xi jtc+ζ ′Mc+λ j+ τt +ϕc+ εi jtc, (5)
where s∗i jtc is the skill level of individual i from the Italian region of origin j who registered in year t to
the registry of Italians living abroad in country c, either measured by the relative educational position
or by the predicted counterfactual log labour earnings that iwould have obtained had he stayed in Italy.
The regression equation relates this measure of skill to Rtc, the average level of relative redistribution
in country c in all years from t to the last year of the data (2015). Since t is usually the year of arrival
of the migrant in the destination country, this definition of redistribution captures the effect of the
tax-transfer-system on the entire income stream received by the migrant in that country.8
The same procedure is applied to other macroeconomic variables that are included in Ztc. This
vector of controls includes the unemployment rate, the growth rate of GDP, and the level of GDP
per capita. These variables are indicators that may shape the income expectations of individuals that
are potentially willing to migrate. Xi jtc is a vector of controls for individual characteristics: year of
birth (polynomial of second degree), sex, Italian region of origin, month of birth, year of arrival of the
first immigrated member of the household, and dummies indicating whether the individual has a prior
8Regressions that employ the level of redistribution only in the year of arrival yield similar results and are included in
the Supplemental Material.
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internal migration experience, was the first household member to arrive in the country of destination,
rural or urban location of origin (definition: < 150 inhabitants/km2), and if the individual lives in the
capital of the host country.9 Mc is a vector of controls for non-varying country characteristics that act
as proxies for the costs of migrating to a particular country. It includes the distance from the Italian
border, a dummy that equals 1 if this country and Italy signed an immigration agreement, and the
share of migrants from the same Italian province residing in that particular country. λ j, τt and ϕc
are fixed effects for the Italian region of origin, the year of arrival, and the country of destination.
Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level.
Table 4 and Table 5 show the results of estimating equation (5) for our two definitions of skills on
the sample of Italian immigrants worldwide. The coefficient of the variable that indicates the relative
level of redistribution in the country of destination is negative, and highly significant in all but one
specification of the model. An increase of relative redistribution by 10 percentage points is associated
with a decrease in the degree of self-selection of Italian migrants of between 4 and 9 percent. These
findings corroborate the insight suggested by the descriptive evidence in the previous Section; less
egalitarian countries attract migrants with higher skills than those attracted by egalitarian countries.
Furthermore, the results hold for both measures of skills, relative education and earnings, as well as
when we perform the analysis separately for men and women, for each Italian macro-region of origin,
and only for those Italian migrants from provinces with at least 10,000 emigrants. Further results
of the regressions which include inequality, as well as measuring redistribution by the coefficient of
residual progression or the marginal tax rate progression with alternative measurements and datasets,
yield the same patterns, and can be found in the Supplemental Material.
Interestingly, two variables that capture so-called network effects show the expected negative
relationship with the selectivity of migrants. Past research argued that networks lower the cost of
migration with a gradient, making it more attractive for low-skilled individuals to migrate, and hence
lowering, on average, the pattern of positive self-selection of particular immigrant groups (e.g. Mck-
enzie and Rapoport, 2007; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010). Our results confirm those findings. The
presence of people from the same province of origin is negatively and significantly associated with
the skill level of migrants. Moreover, the presence of a family member in the country of residence
is associated with a 4 and 20 percent lower degree of skill selection for education and earnings, re-
9When the skill level is measured using earnings as dependent variable, only control variables are included in the
regression that have not been used for the prediction of these earnings.
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Table 4: Redistribution and degree of selection: Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative Redistribution -0.476∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗∗ -0.870∗∗∗
(0.0982) (0.0643) (0.0676) (0.319)
Network size (province of origin) -0.422∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0115)
Other family members migrated earlier (0/1) -0.0449∗∗∗ -0.0431∗∗∗ -0.0392∗∗∗
(0.00444) (0.00431) (0.00428)
Female (0/1) 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.00956∗∗ 0.00963∗∗
(0.00385) (0.00386) (0.00374)
Rural place of origin (0/1) -0.0576∗∗∗ -0.0566∗∗∗ -0.0539∗∗∗
(0.00280) (0.00277) (0.00277)
Internal migration experience before emigration (0/1) -0.0235∗∗∗ -0.0228∗∗∗ -0.0204∗∗∗
(0.00354) (0.00351) (0.00342)
Resident in the capital (0/1) 0.106∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0872∗∗∗
(0.00624) (0.00636) (0.00622)
Distance of country of residence from Italian border (in 1000 km) -0.00293∗∗∗ -0.00540∗∗∗
(0.000760) (0.00111)
Migration agreement between Italy and country of residence (0/1) -0.0843∗∗∗ -0.0733∗∗∗
(0.00689) (0.00777)
Migration policies oriented towards high skilled (0/1) -0.0200∗∗ 0.00428
(0.00867) (0.00973)
Unemployment rate 0.0118∗∗∗ -0.00604∗
(0.00188) (0.00308)
GDP growth 0.00630 -0.00614
(0.00587) (0.00810)
GDP per capita -0.0000579 0.00516∗∗∗
(0.000209) (0.000642)
Constant 0.199∗∗∗ -64.89 -82.25 -29.21
(0.0323) (50.17) (50.45) (49.41)
Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
Country F.E. No No No Yes
Observations 296758 292056 292056 293584
R2 0.011 0.246 0.248 0.253
Notes: Sample are Italian immigrants aged 30-75. Dependent variable in the regressions is the relative educational
position as individual measure of relative skills. Demographic controls include year of birth (polynomial of second
degree), sex, Italian region of origin, month of birth, year of arrival of the individual and of the first immigrated member
of the same household, a dummy indicating whether the individual was the first household member to arrive in the
country of destination, rural or urban location of origin (definition: < 150 inhabitants/km2). Standard errors clustered at
the country-year level. Statistical significance level * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Source: AIRE, own estimations.
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Table 5: Redistribution and degree of selection: Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative Redistribution -0.918∗∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗ -0.836∗∗∗ -0.398
(0.111) (0.0654) (0.0705) (0.336)
Network size (province of origin) -0.347∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗
(0.0475) (0.0472) (0.0536)
Other family members migrated earlier (0/1) -0.198∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗
(0.00926) (0.00906) (0.00902)
Rural place of origin (0/1) -0.120∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(0.00653) (0.00640) (0.00619)
Resident in the capital (0/1) 0.0814∗∗∗ 0.0782∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗
(0.00517) (0.00521) (0.00496)
Distance of country of residence from Italian border (in 1000 km) 0.00130 -0.00117
(0.000865) (0.00108)
Migration agreement between Italy and country of residence (0/1) 0.00728 0.0223∗∗∗
(0.00687) (0.00752)
Migration policies oriented towards high skilled (0/1) 0.0155∗ 0.0217∗∗
(0.00844) (0.0102)
Unemployment rate 0.0158∗∗∗ -0.00136
(0.00254) (0.00311)
GDP growth 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗
(0.00701) (0.00525)
GDP per capita 0.000565∗∗ 0.00462∗∗∗
(0.000223) (0.000692)
Constant 10.02∗∗∗ 9.886∗∗∗ 9.757∗∗∗ 9.727∗∗∗
(0.0358) (0.0539) (0.0555) (0.0534)
Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
Country F.E. No No No Yes
Observations 148729 148410 148410 148729
R2 0.040 0.197 0.199 0.205
Notes: Sample are Italian immigrants aged 35-55. Dependent variable in the regressions is the predicted counterfactual
log labour earnings in Italy as individual measure of relative skills. Demographic controls include month of birth, year
of arrival of the individual and of the first immigrated member of the same household, a dummy indicating whether
the individual was the first household member to arrive in the country of destination, rural or urban location of origin
(definition: < 150 inhabitants/km2). Standard errors clustered at the country-year level. Statistical significance level * 0.1
** 0.05 *** 0.01. Source: AIRE, own estimations.
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spectively. Furthermore, we observe that Italian immigrants originating from rural areas have a lower
degree of selection, while those residing in the capital of their country of destination are more likely
to be positively selected.
Among country characteristics, the distance of the country of destination from Italy is very weakly
associated with selectivity. The same applies to the existence of a bilateral migration agreement
between Italy and the country of destination. Unemployment, GDP growth, and GDP per capita in
the country of destination tend to be positively associated with the degree of self-selection of Italian
migrants.
5.2 Stochastic dominance
As discussed by Borjas et al. (2018), the Roy-Model of self-selection implies a first-order stochastic-
dominance relationship between the skill distributions of movers and stayers. Investigating such a
relationship can yield further insights into the role played by income redistribution in shaping migra-
tion patterns.
We now test for stochastic dominance with respect to the behavior of Italian migrants. As argued
by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), the complete group of stayers might not be a proper comparison
group for movers because of the selection that occurs on unobserved characteristics that also affect the
distribution of earnings. We thus subdivide the group of stayers into two separate groups: i) internal
migrants, i.e. individuals that migrated within Italy between regions; ii) non-migrants, i.e. individuals
that reside in their region of birth. Movers, i.e. individuals in the AIRE dataset, are divided into two
groups according to the amount of redistribution they experienced in the country of destination in
comparison to the extent of redistribution in Italy (again, measured as the average redistribution from
the year of arrival to the last available year in the dataset): i) Italian migrants in countries with higher
redistribution than in Italy; ii) Italian migrants in countries with less redistribution than in Italy. Figure
11 plots the cumulative distributions of the corresponding skills, i.e. predicted earnings in Italy, of
these four groups.
The results are consistent with the Roy-Model of self-selection. The skill distribution of migrants
in countries with a low level of redistribution dominates the distributions of stayers and of migrants
in countries with a high level of redistribution. At the same time, the skill distribution of migrants
in countries with higher redistribution stochastically dominates the distribution of non-migrants, but
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Figure 11: Cumulative distributions of counterfactual earnings
Notes: Counterfactual earnings of individuals have they stayed in Italy are log labor earnings predicted for all individuals
in AIRE after running a Mincer-regression on SHIW data. Distributions for migrants are own estimations using AIRE.
Distribution of non-migrant and internal migrants are own estimations using SHIW. Sample are individuals aged 35-55.
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is dominated by the distribution of internal migrants. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of
distributions shows that all of the differences between the distributions of the four groups visualized
in Figure 11 are statistically significant.
5.3 Selection on unobservable skills
The variables we have hitherto employed to proxy for the individuals’ human capital may fail to
capture idiosyncratic abilities and motivations that affect the individuals’earnings potential, but cannot
be directly observed by the researcher. To assess the relationship between redistribution and the
selection on those unobservable skills, we now conduct two empirical investigations. The aim of each
is to ascertain whether the likelihood to attain certain occupational positions changes with the level
of redistribution, holding observable skills constant. We apply a Probit model on a binary variable
indicating the occupation status hi jtc of individual i who registered in year t to the registry of Italians
living abroad in country c. We adopt two different specifications for h: in one specification, this
variable equals 1 if the individual is unemployed or inactive, and 0 if the individual is employed;
in the second specification, hi jtc = 1 if the individual is an executive or manager, and hi jtc = 0 if
in another type of occupation or unemployed. The educational attainment of the individual, sei jtc, is
included in the equation as a binary variable that is 1 if the individual attained beyond compulsory
education and 0 otherwise. Figure 12 highlights how the composition of Italians abroad varies across
countries with respect to both educational attainment and occupation, and how this compares to those
compositions in Italy.
We estimate the following model:
Prob(hi jtc = 1) =Φ(ιRtc · sei jtc+βRtc+θsei jtc+ γ ′X i jtc+δ
′
Ztc). (6)
Individual-level covariates are included in X i jtc, while country-level covariates appear in Ztc. The
marginal effect of the interaction term, determined through ι and computed at different values of Rtc,
shows how the likelihood of being unemployed or of having a high occupational status (executive or
manager) varies with redistribution for immigrants with high and low education, respectively. Be-
cause of the lower and less stable attachment of women to the labor market, as evidenced in Figure
12, we restrict the sample for this analysis to men.
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Figure 12: Occupation and Education of Italian immigrants aged 30-65 by country
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Table 6: Selection on unobservable skills
Prob(Unemployed) Prob(Executive or Manager)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit estimates
Beyond compulsory education (0/1) -0.299∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0867) (0.0192) (0.0870) (0.0237) (0.0805) (0.0233) (0.0847)
Relative Redistribution 1.522∗∗∗ 1.416∗∗∗ 4.651∗∗∗ 4.513∗∗∗ -1.284∗∗∗ -3.015∗∗∗ 1.944 0.857
(0.183) (0.221) (1.548) (1.553) (0.196) (0.239) (1.324) (1.365)
Beyond compulsory · Relative Redistribution 0.223 0.352 2.041∗∗∗ 1.545∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.229) (0.246) (0.270)
Share of people from the same province in country of residence 0.233∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.139∗∗ -0.771∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ -0.469∗∗∗ -0.462∗∗∗
(0.0573) (0.0586) (0.0676) (0.0676) (0.0620) (0.0612) (0.0635) (0.0638)
Other family members migrated earlier (0/1) 0.0589∗ 0.0585∗ 0.0590∗ 0.0588∗ -0.0661 -0.0689 -0.101∗∗ -0.104∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0319) (0.0456) (0.0456) (0.0452) (0.0453)
Rural place of origin (0/1) -0.0752∗∗∗ -0.0754∗∗∗ -0.0815∗∗∗ -0.0817∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0181)
Internal migration experience before emigration (0/1) 0.0178 0.0180 0.0151 0.0152 0.0727∗∗∗ 0.0739∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0769∗∗∗
(0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0160)
Resident in the capital (0/1) -0.0450 -0.0483 -0.0166 -0.0192 0.0389 0.0253 0.118∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.0363) (0.0367) (0.0384) (0.0385) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0241) (0.0241)
Unemployment rate -0.0340∗∗∗ -0.0332∗∗∗ 0.00630 0.00720 0.0669∗∗∗ 0.0682∗∗∗ -0.00495 -0.00185
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0130) (0.0131)
GDP growth -0.0137 -0.0133 -0.0183 -0.0185 -0.109∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ 0.00377 0.00236
(0.0210) (0.0212) (0.0238) (0.0241) (0.0294) (0.0296) (0.0250) (0.0251)
GDP per capita -0.0113∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗ -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0117∗∗∗ 0.00573∗∗∗ 0.00571∗∗∗ -0.00490 -0.00325
(0.00112) (0.00118) (0.00328) (0.00334) (0.00154) (0.00154) (0.00336) (0.00340)
Constant 33.09∗∗∗ 33.17∗∗∗ 32.93∗∗∗ 33.06∗∗∗ 60.01∗∗∗ 61.01∗∗∗ 58.67∗∗∗ 59.45∗∗∗
(2.768) (2.783) (2.762) (2.777) (2.717) (2.797) (2.783) (2.848)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country F.E. No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 106214 106214 106214 106214 106137 106137 106137 106137
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.057 0.060 0.060 0.234 0.235 0.250 0.251
Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) to (4) is one if the individual is unemployed or inactive, and zero if in an
employment situation. Dependent variable in columns (5) to (8) is one if the individual is an executive or manager, and
zero if unemployed or in another type of occupation. Demographic controls include year of birth, year of arrival, italian
region of origin, a dummy indicating whether the individual was the first household member to arrive in the country of
destination, rural or urban location of origin (definition: < 150 inhabitants/km2), and dummy variables indicating if the
individual has an internal migration experience prior to emigration and if he or she lives in the capital of the host country.
Standard errors clustered at the country-year level. Sample are Italian immigrants aged 30-65. Statistical significance
level * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Source: AIRE, own estimations.
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients of the Probit models. In the first and third columns of
both specifications of the dependent variable, the coefficient on the interaction term is restricted to
be zero. The marginal effects of the interaction terms for different levels of relative redistribution are
plotted in Figure 13. Again, our findings are in line with the hypothesis of the Roy-Model: there is
a positive relationship between returns to skills and the self-selection of immigrants on unobservable
characteristics. Controlling for education, redistribution is associated with an increased likelihood of
being unemployed or inactive, and a lower likelihood of being an executive or manager. However,
in the case of the latter dependent variable, once country fixed effects are included, the coefficient
ceases to be significantly different from zero in both applications. The reason for this could be that
the largest variation in the level of redistribution takes place between countries.
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Figure 13: Selection on unobservable skills
Notes: Dots show the predicted probabilities for different levels of relative redistribution. Left figure shows the marginal
effects of the interaction term in model (2) on Table 6, right figure shows the marginal effects of the interaction term in
model (6).
The evidence in favor of the Roy-Model is reinforced by looking at the likelihood of being in
each of those states for individuals with different educational attainments. As is evident from the
marginal effects displayed in in Figure 13, the likelihood of being unemployed is significantly lower
for individuals with higher educational attainments. Interestingly, this likelihood increases, regardless
of an individual’s level of education, with increasing degrees of redistribution. The greater is the
difference in the likelihood between levels of education, the higher is the level of redistribution.
The same pattern is observed for the likelihood of being an executive or a manager. Particularly
among individuals with higher educational levels, the likelihood of being an executive or a manager
is substantially higher when the level of redistribution is low.
6 Quantifying the Effect of Monetary Returns on Migration
6.1 International income differentials
After having ascertained the empirical relevance of governmental income redistribution in shaping
migration patterns, we now turn to a quantification of the pecuniary incentives to migrate, and of the
impact of redistributive policies. As described in Section 3, for four countries there are no comparable
national surveys that can be combined with the AIRE dataset in order to predict post-fisc incomes; the
entire analysis in this Section is therefore restricted to nine countries. For those available countries,
Figure 14 shows the average net returns to migration to the actually chosen country, estimated with
LIS data for the Italian migrants in our sample. Net returns are defined as the difference between the
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predicted yearly disposable household incomes (net of taxes and transfers) in the country of destin-
ation and the counterfactual disposable income in Italy.10 The age-range of the population is 35-55.
All values are in international US-Dollars using purchasing power parity at 2011 prices.
Estimated monetary returns reach almost 4,000 USD per month in the case of highly-educated
Italians who migrated to the US. Of course, such large income differences do not allow one to infer
correspondingly large differences in living standards or well-being, in particular because of substan-
tial cross-country differences with respect to the public provision of education, health care, child and
old-age care, and retirement income. Net returns of Italian migrants to the four EU countries in our
sample, with welfare-state arrangements that are more similar to those in Italy, are in a range between
about 600 and 1,000 USD PPP per month. Migration to Brazil generates positive monetary returns
only for highly-educated migrants, suggesting that negative migration costs may be empirically rel-
evant for some individuals in some countries.11
6.2 Migration choice
We now estimate a discrete-choice model of the decision to migrate as a function of the net incomes
that can be obtained in Italy and the potential destination countries, taking personal characteristics
and place characteristics of the countries of destination into account. Models of this type are usually
applied to estimate the determinants of the migration decision (e.g. Davies et al., 2001; O’Keefe,
2004; Vigdor, 2002). A similar set-up has been adopted, for instance, by Grogger and Hanson (2011)
on aggregate data to test the selection of international migrants.
We pool our administrative data on Italian migrants with the Italian survey data on stayers and
run an alternative-specific conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974). The explanatory variables are
either alternative-specific or case-specific. The former vary among countries and individuals, while
the latter vary only among individuals. The model is motivated by a random utility framework, which
has the potential utility of migrant i in country c= 1, ...,C as a function of the obtainable net income
10We also estimate the returns in terms of equivalized household income (using the square root scale) and report the
results in the Supplemental Material. However, since the decision on family formation and number of children might be
endogenous to the migration decision and the choice of the host country, in our main applications we rely on the total
household disposable income to measure the net returns to migration.
11As explained above, we perform a sensitivity analysis taking into account that education systems are of different
quality and, hence, migrants that acquired their education in their source country have a different productivity level than
the average of the host country’s population. We follow the procedure proposed by Razin and Wahba (2015) and use
their estimates for educational quality based on PISA test scores to correct for the quality of education systems between
source and host country. All these estimations results, and an exhaustive explanation of the procedure, can be found in the
Supplemental Material.
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Figure 14: Predicted monetary returns to migration
Notes: The coefficients used to predict the net incomes and counterfactual net incomes of immigrants in AIRE are estim-
ated using LIS data, running an augmented Mincer regression for each single country on disposable household income
including the variables sex, age, quadratic age, education, and an indicator on whether at least one child lives in the house-
hold. Disposable incomes (in international US Dollars applying Purchasing Power Parity) of Italian immigrants and their
counterfactual in Italy are predicted using the coefficients of this regression. Returns to migration are then defined as the
difference between predicted incomes in the destination country and the counterfactual income in Italy. Source: AIRE
and LIS, own estimates.
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in that country and other country variables. Such an income varies for each individual depending
on his or her level of education and other individual characteristics, as well as some other country-
specific characteristics that may vary for each individual depending on his or her year of migration.
The model can be expressed as
Uic = γ ′Zic+α ′cAic+ εic, (7)
where Uic is the utility derived from the potential choice of each alternative country of destination,
including the decision to stay in Italy. The country actually chosen by i is the one that is expected to
maximize his or her utility. The vector Zic includes the individual’s net income in the various countries
as well as other alternative-specific characteristics. Aic is a vector that contains dummy variables for
each country and individual specific characteristics that do not change across alternatives. These are
interacted with each potential choice, yielding coefficients αc for each potential country of destination.
Hereby, we must set one of the countries as the baseline alternative, setting αk = 0 for this baseline
country k. We set Italy – i.e. the choice to stay – as baseline when the full decision set is evaluated,
and Switzerland when the regression is run just on the sample of movers only. εic is the random
component, which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed with an extreme-value
distribution. Under this assumption the probability that i chooses destination country c is
Prob(Dic = 1) =
eγ
′Zic+α ′cAic
∑Cj=1 eγ
′Zi j+α ′cAi j
, (8)
where Dic is an indicator of i’s decision regarding the country of destination. Each individual chooses
among the 10 countries in the choice set, including Italy. Hence, the dataset is expanded to encompass
10 observations for each individual where Dic is equal to one if c is i’s actual country of residence and
zero otherwise.
Z captures the circumstances the individual faces in the actual country of residence and that he or
she would face in the other potential destinations, for instance, the different amounts of disposable
household income. Individual level control variables included in A are indicators for age, sex and the
Italian geographic region of origin. The model is estimated on the whole sample, as well as separately
for each education group. Population weights are applied.12
12As before, for SHIW we use the data design weights and for AIRE we compute weights that counterbalance the
observations with missing information on educational attainment.
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Table 7: Conditional Logit Estimates I
w/ Italy w/o Italy
Education Level All Low Middle High All Low Middle High
Choice: Destination Country
Predicted Net Income (absolute) 0.967∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.0736∗∗∗ 0.0917∗∗∗ 0.0429∗∗∗
(0.0300) (0.0481) (0.0466) (0.0772) (0.00588) (0.0192) (0.0147) (0.0146)
Log-lik. -1280992.5 -452687.2 -386660.9 -412886.2 -333002.3 -94932.3 -98838.1 -123278.8
Observations 1519960 558070 437330 524560 1326195 481896 378963 465336
Cases 151996 55807 43733 52456 147355 53544 42107 51704
Alternatives 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9
ITA AUS BRA CAN CH FRA GBR GER NLD USA
Population Shares 98.820 0.030 0.020 0.030 0.270 0.080 0.230 0.350 0.020 0.170
Predicted Probabilities 98.855 0.027 0.020 0.025 0.257 0.075 0.226 0.334 0.017 0.163
Marginal effect·100 : w/ Italy / w/o Italy
Low Education 0.51 / - 0.01 / 0.12 0.00 / 0.04 0.01 / 0.12 0.09 / 1.41 0.02 / 0.16 0.06 / 0.52 0.27 / 1.83 0.00 / 0.02 0.04 / 0.48
High Education 1.76 / - 0.04 / 0.10 0.03 / 0.07 0.04 / 0.09 0.23 / 0.66 0.21 / 0.41 0.58 / 0.86 0.23 / 0.52 0.04 / 0.10 0.38 / 0.68
Notes: Upper Table shows the coefficients of the alternative specific conditional logit model. The model estimates the
probability to stay in Italy or chose one of the 9 destination countries as a function of predicted net income returns to
migration. Controls for age, sex and the Italian geographic region of origin are included. Standard errors clustered at the
individual level. Sample are Italian immigrants and stayer aged 35-55. Statistical significance level * 0.1 ** 0.05 ***
0.01. Lower Table shows the actual population shares and the predicted probabilities using the estimated parameters of
the model, as well as the marginal effects (multiplied by 100) of a yearly net income rise by 10,000 international USD
PPP in the country on the probability to stay/migrate in/to this country. Source: AIRE and SHIW, own estimations.
Table 7 shows the estimated coefficients of the conditional logit model including only predicted
disposable income as alternative-specific variable and the associated marginal effects of net income
returns on the choice of the country of destination; the first part of the Table includes Italy in the choice
set, the second one excludes it. The estimated coefficient on predicted net income is always positive
and highly significant. This pattern also holds when excluding Italy from the possible choices, and
hence focusing on the population of migrants.13 The marginal effects show that a yearly net income
increase of 10,000 international Dollars PPP in Italy increases the probability of less and highly
educated individuals of staying in Italy by around 0.5 and 2 percent, respectively. To give another
example, the average yearly returns to migration of less educated Italian immigrants in Switzerland,
25,000 USD, are associated to a higher likelihood by 3.5 percent to move to Switzerland instead of to
another possible destination country.
13The patterns of the results do not change when net incomes are estimated taking into account the relative quality
of education systems in source and host country, and when household disposable income is equivalized by the square
root scale. In some of the estimations taking equivalized income within education groups the coefficients change or are
statistically not significant. However, within education groups this income measure has very little variability. Furthermore,
as explained above, because of the endogeneous relationship between the number of household components and the
migration decision, we mostly rely on the total household disposable income as main measure for net returns to migration.
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Table 8: Conditional Logit Estimates II
w/o Country FE w/ Country FE
Education Level All Low Middle High All Low Middle High
Choice: Destination Country
Predicted Net Income (absolute) 0.140∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.0666∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.0890∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0676∗∗∗
(0.00592) (0.0200) (0.0156) (0.0147) (0.00604) (0.0200) (0.0154) (0.0149)
Share of migrants from the same province of origin 4.528∗∗∗ 5.227∗∗∗ 3.952∗∗∗ 2.368∗∗∗ 4.598∗∗∗ 5.246∗∗∗ 4.063∗∗∗ 2.416∗∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0464) (0.0502) (0.0566) (0.0274) (0.0466) (0.0508) (0.0568)
Distance of country of residence from Italian border (in 1000 km) -0.000265∗∗∗ -0.000410∗∗∗ -0.000332∗∗∗ -0.000413∗∗∗
(0.00000801) (0.0000174) (0.0000143) (0.0000141)
Language relatedness 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.0472∗∗∗ 0.0548∗∗∗
(0.00121) (0.00228) (0.00222) (0.00228)
Unemployment rate 0.207∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.0968∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0670∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.00425) (0.00962) (0.00822) (0.00716) (0.00463) (0.0101) (0.00889) (0.00796)
GDP per capita 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0263∗∗∗ 0.0480∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗∗ 0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0642∗∗∗ 0.0607∗∗∗
(0.000841) (0.00195) (0.00153) (0.00147) (0.00105) (0.00220) (0.00182) (0.00189)
Log-lik. -313578.3 -84191.8 -94663.3 -121661.6 -310441.4 -83915.7 -93541.1 -121069.4
Observations 1322106 481142 377514 463450 1322106 481142 377514 463450
Cases 147187 53497 42034 51656 147187 53497 42034 51656
Alternatives 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Notes: Probability to chose one of the 9 destination countries as a function of predicted net income returns to migration
and other country characteristics. Controls for age, sex and the Italian geographic region of origin are included. Sample
are Italian immigrants aged 35-55. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. Statistical significance level * 0.1 **
0.05 *** 0.01. Source: AIRE, own estimations.
Table 8 shows the estimated coefficients of the conditional logit model, including the full set of
alternative-specific control variables and excluding Italy as a possible destination. The coefficient
on net income is positive and significant. Furthermore, the probability of choosing one country over
another is positively associated with language relatedness and GDP per capita, and negatively with
the distance of the country from the Italian border.14 Against the expectations, the coefficient on the
unemployment rate is positive and rather uniform across education groups. However, the unemploy-
ment rate has very little variation between and within countries, and the economic significance of the
coefficient is rather limited. The positive association between the share of migrants from the same
province of origin and the likelihood of residing in a particular country is merely mechanical and
serves here just as a control variable.
A crucial assumption of most discrete-choice models is the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
The violation of this assumption cannot be excluded here, neither intuitively nor by a Hausmann test.
One possible way to circumvent this problem would be to run a multinomial Probit. However, this is
computationally infeasible with so many options and observations as in our case. Hence, we adopt a
different approach: We subdivide the sample into close and far away locations. For both sub-samples,
the results confirm our main finding; namely, a positive and significant effect of disposable household
income on the migration choice.
14Language relatedness is measured as the genetic distance between languages, on a scale from 0 to 100, retrieved from
the project eLinguistics.
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6.3 Impact of redistribution
As the findings presented above clearly indicate, redistributive policies should be evaluated with an
eye to their impact on migration patterns. Here, we attempt to estimate how emigration flows from
Italy would be affected by changes in governmental income redistribution in Italy. We perform a back
of the envelope calculation using our estimates of Section 6.2 to evaluate the reaction of individuals
with different skill levels to a change in their returns from migration induced by a redistributive policy
in Italy, leaving unaltered the circumstances prevailing in the potential destination countries (i.e. we
neglect general-equilibrium effects).
Our policy exercise also neglects the impact of Italian redistributive policy on the decisions of
foreigners who may migrate to Italy. The bulk of international migration to Italy originates from
Eastern-Europe, Africa, and Asia (Istat, 2019), also including a considerable number of illegal im-
migrants estimated to be between 7 and 12 percent of foreign residents (OECD, 2018). Of course,
illegal migrants are excluded from social transfers. An additional amount of redistribution in Italy
might increase the incentive to migrate to Italy for those individuals who expect to acquire a legal
migrant status later on. This may, however, be offset by higher remittances that make their family
members remain in the source country. Given the lack of data, we simply assume that such migration
flows do not respond to changes of distributive policies in Italy.
Consider a small, budget neutral, increase of progressivity in Italy, approximated by a linear
redistributive scheme on top of the currently existing tax-transfer system. This scheme consists of
a yearly demogrant G > 0 received by all adult Italian citizens living in Italy that is financed by a
proportional tax on those citizens’ gross incomes. Assuming that the general-equilibrium effects of
this measure are of the second order, we ensure budget neutrality of such an operation with respect to
the ex-ante resident population. This yields an increase in household disposable income for a resident
that is given by
∆= nG(1− Y
gross
nY
), (9)
where Y gross is the household gross income and Y the average per-adult household gross income
of the resident population aged 35-55; n is 1 if the household has a single adult and 2 for couples. As
shown by equation (9), households with below-average income gain from this policy, households with
above-average income lose, and the size of the gain strictly decreases with household gross income.
39
The degree of progressivity of this policy is fully captured by the demogrant: the larger is G, the more
progressive is the policy.
As we did for net incomes, we also predict the gross household incomes in Italy, and their average
for the resident population, using LIS data. We run a Mincer regressions including sex, age, quadratic
age, and education on the resident population aged 35-55 and use the coefficients of this regressions
to predict the gross incomes of Stayer, as well as the counterfactual incomes in Italy for the migrants
in our sample.
Using equation (8) from Section 6.2 we can estimate variations in migrations flows induced by
higher progressivity in Italy. For illustration purposes, we compute the predicted effects of a policy
that sets G = 1,000 USD PPP while keeping constant the net incomes in the other countries.15 We
employ an alternative-specific conditional logit – used before and described in Section 6.2 – replacing
Y net with Y net +∆ in the case of staying in Italy. Hereafter, we compare how the predicted probab-
ilities to migrate or to stay in Italy vary when adopting the estimated parameters for each education
group. Table 9 shows the results of this exercise. We find that the policy would induce 0.04 % of
the total population of less educated individuals to remain in Italy rather than leave the country, and
approximately 0.12 % of the highly educated to leave Italy. We also predict that about 0.006 % of
the Italian population with an intermediate level of education would prefer to stay in Italy if these
redistributive measures were enacted.
In absolute terms, the relocation pattern caused by this policy across all education groups is pre-
dicted to concern some 7,000 individuals, and to leave the total number of residential population in
Italy virtually unaffected. However, this estimation fails to capture relocation incentives that concern
destination countries not included in our sample. To grasp how this translates in absolute terms on the
change in the total number of potential Italian movers worldwide, we simply apply an extrapolation
factor. We define this factor as q= N
tot
Nsample , where N
tot is the total number of Italians born in Italy that
live abroad, including both the countries that we have at our disposal and the rest of the world; Nsample
is the number of observations in our sample used for this exercise. Since we only have the information
about the total number of Italians registered as living abroad (4,636,647), and do not know how many
of these were born in Italy, we approximate this number adopting the same share of Italians born in
Italy that we observe in our data. The average share of Italian migrants born in Italy over all Italians
15The Italian GDP measured in international Dollars PPP in 2017 was about 2,311 Billions (Source: World Economic
Outlook 2017, International Monetary Fund, April 2018). The Italian adult population is about 52 Million people. The
policy we investigate would thus have a fiscal impact of about 2.3 percentage points of Italian GDP.
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Table 9: Policy Experiment - Predicted Change in Migration Flows for G= 1000
Level of Education
Low Middle High
Share (in %) Pr(Y net ) Pr(Y net +∆) Share (in %) Pr(Y net ) Pr(Y net +∆) Share (in %) Pr(Y net ) Pr(Y net +∆)
AUS 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.03
BRA 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05
CAN 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
CH 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.46 0.71 0.75
FRA 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.26 0.12 0.13
GBR 0.07 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.66 0.36 0.38
GER 0.47 0.35 0.34 0.18 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.41 0.43
ITA 99.10 99.07 99.11 99.04 99.12 99.13 97.58 97.70 97.58
NLD 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02
USA 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.48 0.59 0.61
Total population (Mover and Stayer) 8,076,831 5,860,798 2,848,098
Change in outflows - 0.040 % - 0.006 % 0.124 %
In-sample population change - 3204 - 338 3542
Extrapolation q∗ = 1.41 - 4518 - 476 4994
qu = 1.52 - 4870 - 513 5384
ql = 1.28 - 4101 - 432 4534
Notes: Upper part of the Table shows the weighted shares of Italian citizens residing in the distinct countries by their level
of education compared to the predicted probabilities of the alternative specific conditional logit models estimated on the
predicted net household income before and after adding ∆. Lower part of the Table shows: The weighted total population
of Italian citizens for each education group, including stayer and mover in each of the nine possible destination countries
of this exercise. The estimated percentage change in outflows from Italy to the other countries. The absolute population
change of flows from Italy to the countries in the sample, and an extrapolation of the change in worldwide flows applying
different extrapolation factors. Source: AIRE, SHIW, and LIS, own estimates.
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Figure 15: Policy Experiment - Predicted Change in Outflows and Net incomes for G > 0 by Level
of Household Income
Notes: Graph shows the predicted changes in the probability to stay in Italy after policies that change net household
income by ∆ for different amounts of G. Dots show corresponding values of the deciles of the distribution of gross
household income. Source: AIRE, SHIW, and LIS, own estimates.
living abroad is 31.39 % in the AIRE data at our disposal, ranging from 8.16 % in Brazil to 53.36 %
in the US. Using the average value yields an extrapolation factor of q∗ = 1.41. We keep the other two
shares to estimate a lower and an upper bound; ql = 1.28 and qu = 1.52, respectively. Based on this
extrapolation procedure, the simulated redistributive policy prompts around 4,500 individuals with
low educational attainment to stay in Italy rather than move to a foreign country. The same policy
causes around 5,000 highly educated individuals to leave their country of origin.16
In the last part of this exercise, we measure the effects of the considered reform at different
quantiles of the income distribution. Furthermore, we vary the level of the demogrant G. Figure
15 shows the results of this sensitivity analysis. As is evident, the pattern does not change and the ef-
fects become stronger with rising G. For instance, the probability of top income earners in the highest
decile to leave Italy is about four times higher when the demogrant is set to an amount of 5,000 USD
PPP.
16When the relative quality difference of educational systems between countries is taking into account, the number of
low educated staying in the source country is 4,023 while 4,211 high educated leave. All results can be found in the
Supplemental Material.
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Finally, we investigate how the top 1 percent of the distribution would react to the reform. Our
results show that in the top percentile the probability to stay in Italy decreases by 0.20, 0.40, and 0.92
percentage points for G equal to 1,000, 2,000, and 5,000 USD, respectively. Applying the out-of-
sample extrapolation explained above, this translates into 422 top-one-percent income earners leaving
Italy as a consequence of the reform with G = 1000 (for G = 2000 and G = 5000 the numbers are
844 and 1942 people, respectively). In our exercise, these people contribute to around 0.009 percent
of the entire amount redistributed by the government through this reform. Since the survey data we
use to impute incomes fail to cover the super-rich, these findings do not contradict the literature that
reports strong migration responses to taxation of the super-rich.
7 Conclusions
This paper has studied the impact of governmental income redistribution at the country level on the
skill composition of international migration flows. Our key contribution is to employ, for the first
time, a large administrative dataset of the Italian government that includes the bulk of the population
of Italian citizens living abroad. In addition to its advantages in terms of reliability and coverage,
this dataset offers a precious opportunity to test the predictions of the Roy model because Italy is a
country with an intermediate degree of income redistribution, with ample outflows of workers both
to more progressive countries and to less progressive ones. We can thus simultaneously assess the
welfare-magnet effects exerted upon the low-skilled and the rich-repulsion effects exerted upon the
high-skilled.
Our results confirm the predictions of the underlying theory: a lower degree of income redistribu-
tion is significantly associated with a positive skill selection of Italian immigrants. On the contrary,
countries with more progressive tax and transfer systems largely attract immigrants from the lower
end of the skill distribution. The statistical significance of these patterns is confirmed by a multitude
of distinct exercises and test procedures.
The relevance of taxes and transfers in shaping migration incentives is often stressed in policy
debates, usually in order to argue in favor of reducing progressivity, and sometimes in order to call
for internationally coordinated taxes. In order to better inform this debate, we have run simple policy
experiments in our setting, quantifying the impact of additional income redistribution in Italy on the
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migration choices of Italian citizens. Our results indicate that even large increases in the degree of
redistribution have small effects on the skill composition of the resident population in Italy.
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